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Understanding the Rise and Transformation of
Business Collective Action in India∗
Aseema Sinha

Abstract
Scholars of business associations have recently learned a great deal about how associations contribute to development, but much less about the origins of such developmental
associations. This essay introduces and assesses a new political explanation for the origins
of ‘developmental associations.’ Conventional wisdom holds that developmental associations must be able to rise above political and collusive pressures and establish autonomy
from states. Yet, I argue that these associations’ developmental capacities emerge as a result of active state support by key actors, and in response to challenges and threats posed
by competitive business organizations. Developmental associations emerge and acquire
their capacities as they confront internal threats from other associations, as well as utilize the opportunities presented by the national state and international channels. In this
view, functional or organizational capacity is not enough, rather, developmental business
associations, must exhibit political capacity—that is the ability to manage the political
environment, and respond to the structure of opportunities and threats. This explanation
views developmental business associations as political organizations seeking power as well
as offers a historically sensitive analysis of transformation of business politics in reforming
India.
KEYWORDS: Development, Collective Action, Business Associations, Globalization,
Developmental Associations, India
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1

In India, in 1992, an engineering association called Confederation of
Engineering Industry transformed itself into an all-industry association and
1
changed its name to Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). At that time,
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and
Association of Chambers of Commerce (Assocham), two national associations,
dominated India’s business scene. While many regional and sectoral business
associations represented the diversity of business in India, a delayed international
opening and democratic continuity had cemented a well-connected, protectionist
elite—FICCI. FICCI was especially powerful with strong connections to the
ruling Congress Party and the bureaucratic apparatus (Kochanek 1974; 1985;
1986; 1987; 1996). Nevertheless, another association rose to challenge its
dominance in the early 1990s. Within a decade, CII rose to become a nationally
recognized association representing diverse sectors of Indian industry. In
response, FICCI, until then the dominant business association, revived itself and
2
became increasingly developmental in nature. Thus, currently, India has two
dominant developmentally oriented associations—CII, and FICCI—which
compete with each other but also pursue many developmental activities at both
the central and provincial levels.3
How may we understand such a quick and successful transition from a
sectorally based, somewhat, narrow concerns of an engineering association into a
nationally recognized apex association? This transformation poses a puzzle to
theories of business development in countries like India. In a situation of ‘statist
pluralism’ as in India (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, 255), where numerous groups
vie for the state’s attention, the emergence of a developmentally oriented business
association is unexpected.4 Olson (1965), Bardhan (1984 [1998]) and Rudolph

1

CII’s historical antecedents lie in the engineering industry. In 1974, the Association of Indian
Engineering Industry (AIEI) was formed as a result of a merger of two engineering associations.
In 1986 AIEI was re-christened as Confederation of Engineering Industry (CEI) as it began to
invite other associations to be members. In 1992, it expanded its scope to become an all-industry
association, and renamed itself as Confederation of Indian Industry (CII).
2
Following Doner and Schneider (2000, 263), I define developmental associations as associations
that improve the functioning of markets and states. For example, a developmental association may
work toward the provision of better infrastructure by the state, or help firms to improve their
quality performance, or help them to secure export markets through trade fairs, market surveys etc.
3
Assocham, a smaller organization, is less powerful and visible but also performs many
developmental activities.
4
The literature on business and labor and state relations has been organized around the idea of
democratic or societal corporatism (in contrast to liberal pluralist capitalism) associated with
northern European countries. Scholars writing on developing countries introduced some
innovations in the concept by invoking the concept of state corporatism where the state itself
organized corporate interests, found in many Latin countries (e.g. Mexico and Brazil). Yet, the
concept of state corporatism failed to adequately capture non-corporatist countries like India
where state domination co-existed with multiplicity and plurality of societal interests. This led

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005

2

Business and Politics

Vol. 7 [2005], No. 2, Article 2

and Rudolph’s arguments (1987) would suggest that rent seeking distributional
5
coalitions would be the norm in an established democracy like India. Second, this
transformation in business collective action in the early 1990s coincided with a
comprehensive liberalization program wherein the role for collective action
seemed accentuated. What governance role could a business association perform
in the face of the apparent withdrawal of the state from regulatory activity?
Liberalization seemed to reduce the role for political lobbying; yet, an
organization that developed new tools of political access and influence rose to
prominence. Furthermore, the transformation of an engineering association into
an all industry association posed immense collective action dilemmas and
obstacles for the association—FICCI, the competitor organization, enjoyed access
to the then formal mechanisms of power, the membership base of CEI was not
supportive of such a move, and a consultant had recommended against such a
transformation. Moreover, competition between associations could weaken both
associations. Yet in India, an engineering association transformed itself into an
all- industry confederation and its competitor acquired many developmental
6
features. While competition between associations in India has led to
fragmentation of business representation, it has also stimulated many
developmental activities by the associations.
This sudden transformation in business politics in India also raises a larger
theoretical puzzle about business collective action. When and how does business
collective action emerge and succeed in developing country contexts? We know
that common interests may not mobilize easily in defense of those interests (Olson
1965; Hardin 1982; Oliver 1993), yet systematic empirical and theoretical
attention to the political context and institutional mechanisms that enable or
hinder the formation and consolidation of common or collective interests remains
scanty. We need better answers to the question: How does business–an integral
segment of society—emerge to solve its collective action dilemma in dirigiste
contexts and adjust in a rapidly changing and internationally complex world? One
reason for this lacunae in the literature is that despite its power, business often
finds it difficult to mobilize collectively to achieve broader developmental goals,
7
especially in developing and large country contexts. In most developing
Rudolph and Rudolph (1987, 252-258) to propose a new concept: involuted pluralism or state
dominated pluralism to refer to India.
5
Also see Kochanek (1974); Herring (1999).
6
The dependant variable of interest in this article is the transformation of a sectoral association
into a multi-sectoral association and subsequent resurgence of a traditional association with many
developmental features.
7
See Smith (2000) for the argument that business in the US comes together only rarely. Also see,
Hart (2004) and Vogel (1989). Offe and Wiesenthal (1985), in contrast, suggest that business
collective action is easier than labor mobilization. For a comparative approach to the study of
business-state relations see Wilson (2003). For studies of business-state interaction in other
dirigiste contexts see, Payne (1994); Maxfield and Schneider (1997); Schneider (1998); and
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countries, states are more powerful and capital scarce and dependent upon
government initiatives. State dirigisme and weak business development creates
the conditions for rent-seeking relations between state actors and business groups,
8
precluding positive and developmental relations between the two. Business
associations, among the various ‘weapons’ of political mobilization wielded by
business, promise an answer to the collective action dilemma posed above.9 In
line with this realization, analytical and empirical attention has recently focused
on the relationship between business associations and economic performance.
Some argue that business associations are intrinsically rent seeking and
distributive.10 Others assess the impact of voluntary associations on economic
performance, macroeconomic stabilization, and democratic consolidation in a
more balanced manner.11 Recent reinterpretation of the East Asian miracle has
sought to re-evaluate the role played by business associations and collective
12
business groups. This body of work led scholars to challenge and go beyond the
erstwhile “negative presumptions against ‘special interests’ in Mancur Olson’s
theories of collective action and their extensions in the NIE” (Doner and
Schneider 2000, 262; Maxfield and Schneider 1997) to highlight the “positive”
contributions of business associations. Such approaches highlight how business
associations may respond to the functional needs of a system in crisis, and may
perform “market-supporting or market-complementing activities” responding to
crucial market and state failures pervasive in many developing and transitional
economies.
Yet, these approaches are mostly concerned with the impact of business
associations on economic development and leave unaddressed a prior question:
Where do developmental associations come from? That is, what are the political
(as opposed to efficiency-based) dynamics of the genesis and reproduction of
developmental business associations? Neo-institutionalist approaches to the study
of collective action, more generally, link material interests to action to effects, but
are unable to grasp how new patterns of collective action arise or are
Kingstone (1999).
8
Krueger (1974); Herring (1999); Evans (1995); and Kochanek (1974). South Korea and Japan are
exceptions to this general pattern: In South Korea, for example, business and state came together
to craft a developmental state [Fields (1997); Kang (2002); Noble (1998); and Chibber (2003)].
The contrast of South Korea with India is especially instructive. Chibber (2003) compares early
business development in India and South Korea and argues that in early independent India (1940s
and 1950s), the business class launched an offensive against developmental goals of the new
Indian state, thus aborting a mutually beneficial relationship; this contributed to a failed
developmental state in India.
9
I define business associations as voluntary membership-driven organizations of business people,
firms, or other associations.
10
Olson (1965).
11
Swensen (2002); Schmitter (1994); Perez-Aleman (2003); and Goldsmith (2002).
12
Kim (1993); Kang (2002); and Evans (1995).
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transformed. An answer to this question would lead us to a more careful analysis
of the political context of business development across diverse contexts. In a
recent assessment, Ben Ross Schneider undertakes such a comparative analysis
arguing that varying patterns of business organization may be traced to the actions
13
of state officials (2004). This emphasis on the role of the state is a crucial
corrective to the existing focus on functional attributes of associations. Building
on his insight, I pay attention to openings in the “political opportunity structure,”
which allows us to better understand the role of state actors and other micropolitical institutions in encouraging or disorganizing business.14 These insights
allow a more political analysis of how business strategies (developmental or
otherwise) are themselves molded by the features of the political-institutional
environment.
This paper examines change and transformation in the nature of interest
15
group mobilization and state-business interaction in reforming India. This
examination of a dynamic process allows me to put forward an alternative
framework to the study of interest groups and business associations, one that is
more attentive to the political origins of business power and to contextual
institutional variables rather than mere organizational dynamics. In strong
confirmation of the arguments presented by Schneider (2004), I find that state
actors and intra-state dynamics play an unexpectedly large role in shaping
business development in India even under conditions of neoliberal reform. A
further explication of the conditions under which state actors facilitate business
collective action (when and how) urges me to incorporate a key concept from the
social movement literature—the political opportunity structure. I argue that it is
openings within the state, intra-state conflicts, and weakness of existing business
organizations that may lead certain state actors to encourage other business
groups. Thus, I argue that the rise and reproduction of developmental associations
is shaped by state actors and strengthens the political settlement that underlies
their continued activism in politics. Most crucially, certain critical features of the
political and business context, most notably competition with rival associations
and the federal structure, shape the transformation of business associations and
16
their specific organizational form.

13

Also see Doner and Schneider (2000) section on “external enforcement and economic
performance” (pages 275-278) where they analyze briefly how discipline by states may make
some associations more efficient.
14
This concept is drawn from the social movement literature. For an introduction to the concept,
see Tarrow (1998).
15
In India, an economic reform program was launched in 1985 followed by comprehensive
external and domestic liberalization in 1991.
16
The concept of the political opportunity structure is more general and allows us to compare, for
example, the limited role of the state in shaping business development countries like England
versus their more activist role in Germany. It also could shed light on the disorganization of both
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This emphasis on the political and institutional context must not neglect to
analyze the responses and strategies of the business associations themselves,
which are purposive entities, seeking power for their organizations. Therefore, I
argue that developmental business associations must have political capacity, i.e.
the capacity to strategically respond to the specific external characteristics of the
17
political system in addition to organizational and functional capacity. If this is
so, then the pre-existing and historical institutional framework will profoundly
shape the nature of business power and business activism, thereby challenging the
functionalist expectation that globalization pressures are sufficient to transform
fragmented business organizations into encompassing ones. In contrast, the
incentives, actions, and behaviors of state actors mediate and refract functionalist
imperatives.
In contrast to the approach adopted here, pluralist and neo-institutional
perspectives are non-political and functional: Pluralist theories see the process of
business transformation in non-partisan ways, while neo-institutional accounts see
18
associations responding to market failures and state failures in adequate ways.
My analysis goes against both pluralist and functionalist accounts of business
associations by articulating a more realistic analysis of the political origins of
associational transformation. In both the neo-institutionalists and pluralists
arguments, business associations are mechanisms through which others—business
actors— act; they are not purposive entities or political actors themselves. In
contrast, the evidence presented in this paper shows that it is important to bring
politics back into an analysis of business associations and unite historical and
institutional approaches to the study of collective action by ‘strong’ actors.19 Such
an approach would look at how collective action of business is transformed over
time but without ignoring the role of institutions and political contextual variables
in shaping that transformation. These questions have profound consequences for
our understanding of business collective organization across other systems. While
comparative political economy debates have identified different models of stateinterest group interaction (see Table 1 below) under situations where states are
autonomous and when they are weak, these cross-sectional models do not
generate unequivocal conclusions about the origins or transformations of these
patterns of interest group development from one model to another.

labor and business in the US. For an analysis of the larger political context of business
development in the US, see Gordon (1998); Lehne (2001); and Martin (2000).
17
I elaborate the strategic responses by business associations in another article, “Business
Strategies in Globalizing India: Reproduction and Transformation of Interest Representation in
India.”
18
A classic statement of the pluralist argument is Truman (1971).
19
Following Thelen’s call to unite institutional and historical approaches in comparative political
economy (Thelen 2002).
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Table 1: Comparative Models of State-Business Relations
Autonomous
State
Business
Coherent/Encompassing

20

Corporatism
Or Embedded Autonomy
Germany
South Korea
Mexico
Chile

Dispersed/Fragmented

State Pluralism Or Embedded
Particularism, Or
Over-Developed State
India, Brazil

Vol. 7 [2005], No. 2, Article 2

Weak

Liberal Pluralism

United Kingdom

Pluralist State and Disorganized
Business
United States
21
India

I organize the paper in four parts. First, I lay out the empirical puzzle of
transformation and emergence of a business association in India. In section two, I
examine how openings in the political opportunity structure, represented by prime
minister Rajiv Gandhi’s initiatives, facilitated the rise of CII. Further, the nature
of state power—the power of the civil service and informal patterns of statebusiness interactions—shape business strategies in subtle ways. I go on to analyze
the impact of federalism. The last section analyses how competition in the
business sub-system shapes the emergent associations as well as contributes to the
absence of associational consolidation in India. The conclusion ties the main
argument together.
An Alternative Framework For the Rise of a Developmentally–Oriented
22
Association in India
In January 1992, the then engineering association, Confederation of
Engineering industry (hereafter CEI) transformed itself into Confederation of
20

The concepts in this table are drawn from a rich comparative political economy literature; some
of its salient authors are: Schmitter and Lehmbruch (1979); Lehmbruch and Schmitter (1982);
Amsden (1989); Johnson (1982); Evans (1995); Rudolph and Rudolph (1987); Herring (1999);
Krueger (1974); and Alavi (1982).
21
India has mostly been perceived to have a strong autonomous state but its divided structure also
lends it to be in the right hand box.
22
This analysis relies on primary fieldwork conducted in India, a newspaper database constructed
by the author from six to eight Indian newspapers for the period 1990-2004, primary published
and unpublished documents of the various business associations, and repeated interviews with
members of the various business associations.
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Indian Industry (hereafter CII) seeking to represent the entire industrial sector.
This transformation was not without its naysayers. In fact, its largely engineering
membership base was not supportive of such a move and a consultant hired to
evaluate whether the association should go this route had recommended against
23
such a transformation. At the time, national economic policy was in transition
and it was not very clear what the new role and tasks of such an organization
would be. Initially, the transformation was more in change of name than in fact:
In 1992 the association had only 100 non-engineering members out of a total
membership of 2600, less than 4 percent, and the organization found it difficult to
go beyond its engineering base.24
Despite these uncertain beginnings, the association over time came to
acquire a prominence, and was recognized to be a key partner for many of the
government’s policy initiatives. In March 2004, 12 years after its transmutation,
Tarun Das, the Director-General of CII was asked: “What has been your most
momentous achievement?” He replied: “I think, the really big occasion for us was
to transit from an engineering association to being CII. That opened the window
very wide and created so many new opportunities.”25 CII expanded and diversified
its membership base over time. In 1987, CEI’s membership was 2005 companies,
which grew to 2,567 in 1991 and to 4,700 in 2003.26 In 1991, it had few
multinational members. By 2003, attracted by its political influence, 305
multinational companies had joined the organization.27 By 2003, engineering
industries were about 50.3 percent (around 2,365 firms) of its total members
(4,700 members), a sharp decrease from 1992.28 It is also worth noting that a large
majority of CII’s membership base—95.3 percent—has joint venture
collaborations, mostly with foreign firms.29
A growth in membership corresponded with an expansion in the scope of
its activities. By 2004, it seemed to have a finger in every pie from “social sector
23

Interview with CII official, August 9, 2003. This was confirmed in newspaper reports of the
time. Interestingly, in 1991, given opposition from its members to such a move, the President of
CEI was forced to clarify that, “The Confederation will continue to widen its base without
shedding its industry-specific identity. He also ruled out a change in the name of his organization
to Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) as suggested by some.” “CEI to Pressure Opposition to
accept Reforms Package,” Business Standard, 1 July 1991. By December 1991, CEI had changed
its name to CII.
24
CII, Annual Report, 1993. Interview with senior officials of the CII who had been with the
organization since the mid 1980s.
25
“Interview
with
Tarun
Das
by
Shubhrangshu
Roy,”
March
26,
2004
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/582280.cms (Accessed on March 28, 2004).
26
Annual Report, 1991; Annual Report, 2003.
27
The total list of multinational company members of CII is with the author.
28
Author’s calculations from CII, Membership Directory, 2003.
29
Calculated from CII, Membership Directory, 2003. Pedersen noted a similar finding for the year
1992 (Pedersen 2000).
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development,” to “security dialogue, 30 to election participation awareness
31
32
campaign, to a meditation cell.” It was active internationally and bilaterally,
33
responding to a wide array of security and economic crises faced by India. It was
especially active in the United States and began to engage the US domestic
political process quite intensively.34 The association along with FICCI was invited
to all the key national level advisory bodies and became part of the official
government’s delegation to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999 at
35
Seattle. CII, together with FICCI, came to represent the most prominent sections
of Indian business, relegating Assocham to third rank. It seemed as if business in
India had ‘solved’ its collective action problem and become a joint partner of the
Indian state.
Within the context of a neo-instititionalist framework, CII represents a
classic example of a “developmental association” responding to crucial market
and state failure challenges.36 It supports the ongoing economic reform process
pressuring the government to provide infrastructure (e.g. power sector reform)
and a non-corrupt administration. It self-consciously abjures distributive and
particularistic needs of its individual members, claiming that no narrow and
individual specific demands of members are defended in front of the
government.37 It initiated a quality movement among its member companies and
provided crucial marketing information and other information to its member
companies.
30

CII, Annual Report (2003, 16).
As part of its “corporate social responsibility program” CII requested cellular operators to send a
SMS message to around 35 million voters reminding them to exercise their franchise on polling
day in India (April-May 2004). “CII To pitch in with SMS to Alert Voters,” The Financial
Express, 22 April 2004.
32
The CII, Annual report noted in a section titled, “New Frontiers,” that the CII—Southern Region
had signed a memorandum of understanding with the ‘Indian Centre of Meditation and Dispute
Resolution’ for creating “awareness about the potential of meditation as a preferable means of
dispute resolution and to get industry personnel trained in matters of meditation.” See CII, Annual
Report (2002, 24).
33
For example, it played a major role in diluting opposition to India’s nuclear tests (of 1998) in the
US Congress.
34
Tarun Das, chief mentor of the Confederation of Indian Industry, Kiran Pasricha, CII’s senior
director for North America attended the Democratic Party Convention in Boston, out of only 4
people working on India to do so. See K.P. Nayar, “India Should Use Political Events in the US to
its Advantage,” The Telegraph, 11 August 2003.
35
As part of the government’s delegation, two members of CII were allowed to be part of the
Ministerial deliberations in an advisory capacity.
36
Vanita Shastri argues that CII is a developmental organization (1997). Also see Nayar (1998;
2001), Pedersen (2000); and Kochanek (1995-1996).
37
Officials at different levels of the organization stressed this. Government officials also admit that
CII demands usually relate not to one or two members but to an entire sector or industry. This
does not mean that no member makes such requests but the secretariat seems to have resisted such
internal pressures for the pursuit of narrow particularistic benefits.
31

http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol7/iss2/art2

Sinha: Understanding the Rise and Transformation of Business Collective Action

9

How did a narrow organization concerned only with its own specific
sector transform itself and become developmental? Interpretations that focus on
organizational attributes of the organization or functional needs arising out of
globalization are unable to explain the politically contested process through which
CII came into being and rose to prominence. The functional explanation may
explain why the organization became useful to policymakers; it does not,
however, address the question of why and how such an organization came into
being. It is clear that we need an independent theory of business development in
dirigiste yet pluralist systems; such a theory must be able to account for change
over time, and offer a set of assumptions about incentives and interests of state
and business actors. Thus, what contextual conditions stimulate developmental
versus predatory associational activity needs to be theorized more systematically.
Distribution of Power, the Indian State, and Business Associations in India
Counter-intuitively for our expectation of India where distributional
coalitions are considered to be strong, but in line with Schneider’s (2004) recent
arguments, state actors facilitated the rise of CII as a competitor organization to
FICCI. Moreover, and even more interestingly, state structure (federalism) and
the pattern of state power shaped the activities and strategies of emerging and
reforming business associations alike. Over time, state actors, by sponsoring
different organizations at different points in time, enhanced the competitive
fragmentation within the business sector of the Indian economy. The Indian state
played a crucial role in transforming CEI from its engineering focus to an allindustry focus and in giving it importance. In the mid 1980s, the state leadership
deployed the CEI to further its reform program. Further, the Indian prime minister
gave access, symbolic importance, and explicit tasks to CEI at a crucial moment
in its development.
In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi was elected as India’s new prime minister with a
massive mandate and introduced a reformist agenda. He initiated significant
economic liberalization despite serious opposition from his own party members
38
and a history of dirigiste economic policies in India. His reform program aimed
at technological modernization, external opening as well as a reduction of state
regulation. The most important of these included a relaxation of the restrictive
licensing arrangements, a new fiscal policy aimed at promoting investment and
research, and liberalization of foreign exchange rules to promote the inflow of
finance and technology transfer from abroad. While limited, his reform program
represented one of the first serious attempts to reorient India’s economic strategy
toward more openness and competition. In this quest, he renewed links with the
newly emerging business association, the Association of Indian Engineering
Industry (AIEI), CII's predecessor. FICCI, in contrast, was protectionist, weak,
38

See Kohli (1989) and Harriss (1987) for an analysis of the 1985 reform program.
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and fractionalized and had acquired vested interests in the continuation of the
39
regulatory system rather than its withdrawal. Rajiv Gandhi needed an
organization that was outside of the pre-existing business-state networks, not
troubled by factional politics, and could support his reform program. AIEI, till
then, was based in Calcutta and was a relative outsider to the business-politics
nexus centered in New Delhi. Most importantly, AIEI’s international activities
resonated with Rajiv Gandhi’s reform program, which stressed technological
integration with the West; in contrast, FICCI was relatively more inward looking
in its orientation. AIEI had initiated global linkages with international
40
organizations, other business firms, and groups in the mid 1970s. AIEI and
CEI’s organizational culture and outward orientation resonated with Rajiv
Gandhi’s clean image and reformist agenda.
Most importantly, Rajiv Gandhi needed AIEI when he faced significant
opposition from within his party and the bureaucracy for his reform program.
Most of his close advisors were perceived to be technocratic and out of touch with
the masses. Lacking any supporters within a conservative bureaucracy, and facing
a resistant party, Rajiv Gandhi needed allies and support for his nascent reform
41
program as well as crucial information. Rajiv Gandhi used the various forums
facilitated by CEI to publicize his reform program. As an illustration, in 1988, he
spoke at a conference organized in New Delhi by CEI on the need to simplify
procedures and ensure efficiency in attracting foreign investment.42 CEI’s
leadership publicized and circulated his ideas to the business community. In 1988
Tarun Das, CEI’s Director-General, spoke about the ongoing reform program in
extremely positive terms at several places: ''Rajiv Gandhi is the first Prime
Minister we've had who understood the private sector. He is trying to take us out
of our cocoon and expose us to the real world.''43 On the basis of his consultations
with AIEI Rajiv Gandhi transferred responsibility for company affairs from the
Ministry of Justice to the Industry Ministry. The aim was to remove a major
bottleneck in approval of industrial licenses, which was a major hazard for
businessmen in India. Mr. Tarun Das said at that time, “This was a small but
significant step for domestic and foreign investments and joint ventures. These

39

I analyze FICCI’s weakness below.
In 1976 AIEI started organizing international trade fairs, which allowed their member companies
to initiate international joint ventures and seek export markets. They also started interacting with
business associations in other countries and opened international offices: By 1988 they had four
offices in international cities; by 2001 they had 11 such offices. CII also began co-sponsoring the
World Economic Forum’s India’s Summit, which became a high profile event in the 1990s.
41
The opposition to Rajiv Gandhi’s reform program has been extensively researched: Kohli
(1989); Harriss (1987); and Varshney (1999).
42
The Financial Times, 20th April 1988. Also see, “The Indian Government is Set for a More
Relaxed Approach Towards Foreign Investment,” The Economic Times, 22 April 1988.
43
“India’s Tentative Turnaround,” The New York Times, 29 May 1988.
40
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would now be approved six months to two years earlier.”44 Thus, Rajiv Gandhi
used the organization as a platform to launch his reform program and to gain
support from India’s business community. At that time public sector engineering
firms dominated AIEI and CEI; by encouraging this organization, he was able to
spread his ideas to a sector which was expected to resist some of the changes
planned by him.
Over time, other state actors have continued to use business associations to
initiate and publicize difficult policy change. In the early 1990s, Manmohan
Singh, the then Finance Minister and part of a minority government, was faced
with a similar opposition to his reform program in parliament, where he depended
upon crucial support from opposition parties. He recommended that CII
popularize his ideas of economic reform to the opposition parties in parliament.
CII started organizing forums for parliamentary parties in the early 1990s and has
45
continued that practice ever since. Again, in December 2001, prime minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee asked CII to invite Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan’s former prime
minister to India when it was politically difficult for Vajpayee to take ownership
for that invitation.46 Again, after India’s nuclear tests (in May 1998), Vajpayee
requested CII to use their US connections to change US public opinion in favor of
India.47 In 2003-2004, CII set up a WTO cell in Geneva; Arun Shourie, the then
Minister of Disinvestment and Commerce, suggested that CII monitor the WTO
process more closely.48 In 2004, P. Chidambaram, India’s Finance Minister, asked
the business chambers to convince the left parties in the coalition government to
support an increase in the Foreign Direct Investment cap in the insurance sector.
He said: ''I would like CII and FICCI to address some of our friends in the Left
49
parties and convince them (that the move is progressive).”
AIEI’s meteoric rise to power in the 1980s and 1990s can be directly
traced to the access and importance facilitated by Rajiv Gandhi. In 1985, Rajiv
Gandhi agreed to address the AIEI annual meeting although he had refused a
similar invitation from FICCI.50 He encouraged CEI to submit concept, ‘theme,’
and policy papers to the government, which began to introduce business oriented
perspectives in the government and also support his reform program.51 Rajiv
44

“India to Go Ahead with Election,” The Financial Times, 10 November 1984.
Interview with CII officials.
46
Confidential Interview, Washington DC July 2005. In December 2001, she visited India on a
“private visit” on the invitation of CII soon after the august summit between Pakistan’s president
Musharraf and India’s prime minister Vajpayee.
47
Confidential Interview with author, Washington DC, July 2005.
48
Interview of a senior CII official with author, New Delhi July 17 2003. Interestingly, in the late
1990s, CII had rejected a similar recommendation by a prominent journalist.
49
“FDI insurance: UPA Hopes BJP Will Return Earlier Favour, Indian Express, 13 July, 2004.
50
Kochanek (1995-1996).
51
Interview with senior CII officials. One government official told me: “We needed different
views to stir things up a little; otherwise, Rajiv Gandhi’s program would have gone nowhere. We
45
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Gandhi even played a role in the transformation of the organization from an
engineering association to an all-industry association. Rajiv Gandhi suggested
that CEI represent all industry and move beyond its engineering focus. He is
reported to have told the Secretary-general, Tarun Das: “You are doing good
work. I like the work you are doing. Why don’t you transform into a general
52
industry association?” The secretariat took this proposal to its members and
faced some opposition to this change from within. This led them to hire a
53
consultant to evaluate whether such a change was desirable. The consultant
recommended that the CEI retain its focus as an organization servicing the
engineering industry; he argued that the transformation would be deleterious for
their engineering members leading the association to lose focus. After many
deliberations and discussions within the association, a decision was taken to
override the decision of the consultant and make the organization represent the
whole of Indian industry. Rajiv Gandhi’s sponsorship and the access and power
such a linkage would provide was a major reason for overriding the
recommendation of the consultant.54 Thus, the prime minister played a major role
in transforming an engineering association into an all-purpose industry
association.
His close relationship with the members of the body allowed the
association to acquire political access and influence, which were then denied to
other bodies. Rajiv Gandhi added credibility to the AIEI when he invited AIEI
leaders to accompany him on a trip to the Soviet Union (Kochanek 1995-96). This
was the first time that a business delegation accompanied India’s prime minister
on an official foreign trip; Rajiv Gandhi facilitated this inclusion despite serious
opposition from within the bureaucracy. On hearing of AIEI’s inclusion in the
PM’s entourage, the Indian Ambassador to the USSR (1983-1986), Nurul Hasan
is reported to have telegraphed back his displeasure.55 He told the government:
“The private sector businessmen cannot be part of a state delegation.” Rajiv
Gandhi, on hearing this, told the foreign ministry officials to “throw the telegraph
in the dustbin” and proceeded to take the AIE members with him.56 This action
needed to break down shibboleths and narrow assumptions about government’s role, the public
sector and the like. Input from a different business organization was necessary to this task. So, he
encouraged them and invited them to submit recommendations and concept papers.” Interview
with author, New Delhi, July 13, 2003.
52
This information comes from confidential interviews. I crosschecked this information from a
number of sources and this was confirmed independently in different ways.
53
Prof. S. K. Bhattacharjee of Management Structures and Systems, Mumbai was the consultant
hired for the job.
54
Interview with CII officials, New Delhi, and San Francisco, June 3, 2005.
55
Nurul Hasan was a powerful member of the CPI, hostile to business and close to the Congress
Party. He occupied various key posts; in the mid 1980s he was India’s ambassador to the USSR.
56
Interview of a very high level member of CII with the author, 2nd June, Stanford University,
USA.
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gave AIEI direct political access, a “selective benefit” of representation in a
foreign public policy forum and informal power in their future interactions with
57
other state functionaries. Rajiv Gandhi continued to lend public support to many
58
of AIEI’s and CEI’s ideas. CII used these early political and bureaucratic
contacts within the central bureaucracy to build regular—both formal and
informal—relationships with key elements within the state. Tarun Das recognized
the pivotal role played by Rajiv Gandhi [1985-1989] in CII’s rise. He said: “In
1986, I don’t think CEI was seen as one of the front-ranking organizations. But
between 1986 and 1991 this has been achieved.”59 Recently, he said: “That period
[Rajiv Gandhi’s prime minister-ship] was a crucial period for us [CII].”60 Thus,
the transformation of CII as an industry-wide organization owes in no small part
its existence to the reformist proclivities of the prime minister, who chose to
patronize the AIEI (and its later incarnation, the CEI) when he needed reformist
allies.
Analogously, the expression of state displeasure and withholding of access
has a powerful impact on business associations. After Gujarat riots in February
2002, CII organized a meeting where some of its own members expressed
criticism of the Gujarat government’s chief minister. This public criticism created
a serious rift between CII and the Gujarat government, which even extended to a
cooling of relations with the BJP-led national government. After this withdrawal
of state access, Tarun Das personally visited Gujarat’s chief minister, Mr.
61
Narendra Modi and apologized to him. Despite support from within the
organization for a more public criticism of social violence in Gujarat, CII has
decided not to criticize the state government. In 2004, CII even invited Narender
Modi, Gujarat’s chief minister, to its high profile, India Economic Summit,
organized with the World Economic Forum, in an effort to patch up its differences

57

This confirms Schneider’s argument that, “State actors are the central protagonists in
encouraging the formation of voluntary, encompassing associations, sometimes unintentionally,
and more importantly, intentionally, by offering associations selective benefits such as
representation in policy forums or authority over public functions or funds (Schneider 2004, 11).”
58
For example, in 1986, AIEI came up with a proposal to build Andaman and Nicobar islands for
tourism and industry purposes. Rajiv Gandhi supported this proposal at a news conference in
Dubai.
59
“An Uncanny Ability to Anticipate Events: An Interview with Tarun Das,” Business Standard,
12 January 1992.
60
Interview with author, 2nd June 2005. Publicly, CII credits the 1991 reform program as being
responsible for its rise and transformation but CII’s rise to power had preceded the 1991
liberalization program.
61
“A Sorry Sight,” Business Standard, 10 March 2003; “Mr. Modi and CII: the Wages of Crony
Capitalism,” The Financial Express, 11 March 2003; “After CII, FICCI Reprieve, Promise of Help
for Modi,” Indian Express 14 March 2003. I confirmed this in confidential interviews with CII
officials.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005

Business and Politics

14

Vol. 7 [2005], No. 2, Article 2

with the government and BJP.62 Thus, state facilitation of political access and its
withdrawal has a powerful impact even on institutionally strong associations like
the CII. The state continues to shape the power, activities, and the discursive
strategies of business associations in India.
Even more importantly, the nature of state power and its informal
workings affect the tactics and mechanisms of influence deployed by India’s
business associations. In India’s parliamentary system, the civil service is
permanent and powerful. This led the leadership of CII to interact with the civil
service through many diverse channels. Tarun Das revealingly said in an early
interview: “We have consistently had a policy of working with the civil service
that is there at the centre and the States. We find that they are the administration,
they are the prominent people there. And, therefore, we feel that while we must
address the political level. . . and we do that but on a continuous basis, there is a
63
continuous dialogue and interaction with the bureaucracy at all levels.” Second,
CII had to adapt to the informal ways in which the business–politics relationship
has evolved in India. Tarun Das himself emphasized this in an interview outlining
the process of re-working the FERA [The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act] in
1991-1992. “The FERA is being revised and re-drafted. And, we found out who
are the two or three officers behind the scene. We have a core group on FERA.
We arranged an informal briefing between the core group and the people in the
government working on the re-drafting of the FERA. Our meetings are –informal,
off-the record, not for publicity at all. We are very conscious of the fact that when
we have informal discussions with the government, we don’t go for media
coverage on that. And, we try to build up this relationship of mutual trust very
very carefully and we try to earn that trust through our actions.”64 Responding to a
question about the strengths of CII, Tarun Das, further noted: “We spend a lot of
time interacting informally with the government. Apart from representations, we
give a lot of time to informal discussions.”65 A close observer of CII’s success
said: “CII and Tarun Das understand the nature of Indian system perfectly. He is
the chairman of a company and knows the nitty gritty of India’s business
environment. He has his pulse on its very specific and informal workings. He
knows how it works and how to get around it.”66 Third, given India’s strong state
traditions, business associations present themselves in subsidiary roles rather than
independent interlocutors to the government; the discursive rhetoric of
62

“Mobbed, Modi Shows ‘Civilized’ Face,” The Telegraph, 22 December 2004. The report noted
that the protestors at the summit urged Rahul Bajaj, the person who had expressed his criticisms in
2002, to join the protests but he declined. Also see, “Modi Runs into Protests at WEF,” November
24, 2003, http://in.rediff.com/news/2003/nov/24modi.htm
63
“An Uncanny ability to Anticipate Events: Interview with Tarun Das,” Business Standard, 12
January 1992.
64
Ibid. Emphasis Added.
65
Ibid. Emphasis Added.
66
Interview with Author, December 15, 2004, Washington DC. The interviewee stressed this point.
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associations even in the globalization era is shaped by the dominant nature of
state power in India. Thus, CII has described the association’s relationship to the
67
government as “the junior partner of the government.” Its officially stated
68
principles are: “partnership with government” and a “consensus approach.” One
of the reasons of the success of CII is its ability not to be seen criticizing the
government in international or even domestic forums. CII claims to have a
supportive and collaborative approach rather than a confrontational approach to
its working with the Indian government.69 As one CII official put it: “We do a lot,
I mean, a lot, of quiet lobbying and even criticizing the government but we never
publicize it.70 Thus, CII’s emergence and success in breaking into a pluralistic
interest group arena dominated by many organizations owes itself to crucial
sponsorship by the prime minister, and his reformist allies. This opening up of the
political opportunity structure in the mid 1980s led to the rise and transformation
of AIEI into CEI and then CII. Reciprocally, Rajiv Gandhi’s reform program
represented an opening in the political opportunity structure of the Indian state for
the smaller, external association and CII was able to convert its outside status and
informal connections to its advantage only because it adapted to the nature of
state power in India’s political economy.
The Impact of India’s Federal State on Business Associations in India
In addition, the institutional form of the Indian state, for example, its
federal structure, affects the organizational form, tactics, and activities of CII as
71
well as other associations. The federal “opportunity structure” of the Indian state
67

Tarun Das characterized it thus: “We look at it this way: development is a partnership process
between government and industry. And we are the junior partner of the government.” “Interview
with Tarun Das: An Uncanny Ability to Anticipate Events,” Business Standard, 12 January 1992.
68
“CII, A Profile,” Found in Directory of CII members, 2003, Available with author.
69
This was stressed in all my interviews with CII officials. This point is also noted by Kochanek
(1995-1996).
70
Interview with a high level official of the CII, August 2003. New Delhi. The one exception was
the debate over Gujarat riots. In 2001, the CII organized a forum in which criticism of the Gujarat
government response to the riots in Gujarat was expressed. This created a huge public relations
quagmire for CII as the Gujarat CM showed its anger against the CII and many BJP government
officials expressed their displeasure at CII’s sponsorship of the event.
71
A similar impact of federalism on the organizational structure of business associations may be
found in other federal countries. In Brazil the major industry confederation, CNI, was composed
of 27 state level federations, each with one vote similar to the equal representation of its provincial
units in its national senate (see Schneider 2004, 94). Similarly, in Germany, the BDI is the
umbrella organization of German industry and industry-related service providers and has 15
regional offices in the German Länders (provinces) [http://www.bdi-online.de/]. In the United
States, the NAM (National Association of Manufacturers) and the US Chamber of Commerce all
have offices in the 50 states (The US Chamber of Commerce has 2,800 state and local chambers).
See, http://www.nam.org and http://www.uschamber.com.
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is mirrored in the multi-level structure adopted by CII. CII’s organization consists
of regional offices, state offices and a national office similar to India’s political
72
structure. Interestingly, CII’s predecessor, AIEI, was first noticed by Rajiv
Gandhi at an AIEI organized event with the Uttar Pradesh government in 1983;
this led to a long-standing relationship between the two.73 CII’s offices organize
events and activities for the local state governments and seek favors and
interactions with them. CII’s activities and structure especially respond to
resurgent provincial demands for economic reform in India’s “federal market
economy.”74 In 1995, CII organized its centennial “Partnership Summit” in
Calcutta (West Bengal), publicizing the West Bengal government’s liberalization
policy to the outside world. It, in concert with the state government, signaled that
a radical change in West Bengal reflected a credible and permanent change in its
policy orientation in favor of liberalization. Ever since then, it has held numerous
partnership summits (an annual event); the last two (2003 and 2004) have been in
association with Chandrababu Naidu, the then chief Minister of the state of
Andhra Pradesh and the latest one was held in association with West Bengal
(2005). CII has provided national and even international forums for state chief
ministers to publicize their state’s industrial policies to the domestic and
international arenas; in the process, enhancing CII’s prestige and embedding the
density of interactions between the local leadership and the global arena.75 Thus,
in a federal country, CII has played a major role in disseminating support for
liberalization across India’s states and in ensuring that opposition to the reform
does not coalesce into a full-scale movement against the reform process.76
Interestingly, this also created duplication and the coordination dilemmas with
each CII provincial office organizing similar events simultaneously.77
With an increasing role played by regional states in the ongoing
liberalization process, FICCI has also found itself initiating parallel activities at
the subnational level.78 In 1996 FICCI set up zonal offices, which were further re-
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The organizational structure of CII can be found at www.ciionline.org
Interview with CII official, 2nd June 2005, San Francisco.
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Rudolph and Rudolph (2001).
75
This is true of Bihar, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh.
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For a fine-grained understanding the process by which economic reforms have become
sustainable in India, see Jenkins (1999).
77
Interview with CII officials, Washington DC May 2005; New Delhi, 27 August 2003; and
Bombay, May 2003.
78
FICCI, a federation of regional and sectoral chambers, is at heart a federal organization but its
loose relationship with the much more independent regional chambers meant that coordination
across levels (between the regional chamber and the national FICCI office) remained infrequent.
Each of the regional chambers and their own name, constitution, administration, and finances and
were only loosely associated with FICCI. Thus, state level activities of the FICCI were conducted
under the aegis of the regional chambers rather than under a unified banner of FICCI.
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organized in 2003.79 In 2003, FICCI decided to set up three regional and eight
80
state-level offices to “deepen its state level activities.” This was partly in
81
response to the increasing role played by states in shaping liberalization and
partly in response to the fact that CII had regional and state offices and quite
significant state-level activities. As Dilip Salvekar, the Joint Secretary-General of
the Maharashtra Chamber of Commerce and Industry said: “Being the financial
capital, we needed an organization like FICCI which is involved in national and
international issues. It is most appropriate that FICCI should come to Mumbai
since other national level chambers like Assocham and CII are already here.”82
The power of the existing institutions to shape the nature and organizational form
of business associations speaks to the importance of historical institutionalist
arguments: institutions in India—both formal in terms of federalism and informal
norms about state-business interactions—constrain as well as enable associations.
These two elements—reformist leadership within the state (Rajiv Gandhi’s role),
and openings provided by the federal structure—encompass the changing
“political opportunity structure” that gave birth to a new and developmental
organization in India. To this state-centric analysis we must add another aspect of
the political opportunity structure: changes in the competitive environment of
business, that is, the enhanced inter-associational competition in 1980s and 1990s
India.
Inter-Business Competition in India
The business competitive environment provided a powerful context for the
rise of the CII; interestingly, this inter-business competition for political access
and power continues to shape the form and patterns of collective action in India to
83
this date. While globalization created a functional need to unify associations, the
politics of competition prevented such unity and coherence; business associations
in India continue to be fragmented and to compete intensely.84
First, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the business system entered a
competitive and transitional phase with internal churning within the existing and
79

“FICCI Setting Up Zonal Offices to Address Regional Issues,” The Pioneer, (New Delhi), 24
March 1996.
80
Rajeev Jayaswal, “FICCI Setting Up Regional Offices,” The Financial Express, 4 September
2003. The state level offices were to be set up in Mumbai, Goa, Ahmedabad, Chennai, Bangalore,
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Jenkins (1999); Saez (2002); and Sinha (2005).
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84
For an account of how globalization affects collective action see Cerny (1995).
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predominant business association (FICCI) and the revitalization of another
business association (Assocham). This provided the initial window of opportunity
for a new organization to enter the associational marketplace by providing many
developmental services to both the government and the industry. Second, both the
existing organizations—FICCI and Assocham—were confronted with a history of
intra-organizational challenges and weaknesses that made it possible for a
reformist leader (Rajiv Gandhi) to encourage the transformation of a sectoral
association and cultivate this association. This competitive encouragement of a
relative outsider association set into motion the process through which the
structure of the “business system” changed radically in India. Both these factors
combined to create the ripe political context for the rise of CII.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the existing apex organization—the
FICCI—had weakened. FICCI had been subject to internal infighting and conflict
for almost a decade, but in the mid 1980s, the infighting had broken out again and
in 1987, the association underwent a split when the Bombay group within FICCI
left the organization (Kochanek 1996-1996; 1996). These Bombay business
groups joined Assocham, revitalizing the declining organization in the process.
Thus, the late 1980s and the early 1990s saw a competitive and transitional
“business system” when internal crisis within one of the premier associations
(FICCI) revitalized another (Assocham). Simultaneously, the internal
fragmentation of the existing associations allowed a sectoral association to
acquire prominence and institutional strength somewhat disproportionate to its
actual power at that time.
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw enhanced competition between FICCI
and Assocham, which recurs periodically. The Bombay business houses—some
prominent members of the industrial elite in India—had left FICCI after an
internal fight over bogus membership and the control of decision-making within
FICCI. They joined Assocham, in the process revitalizing it with resources, talent,
and new ideas. Assocham saw a significant influx of money and talent into the
85
organization. Thus, when the CEI thought of catering to the needs of the wider
industry, it first thought of a merger with Assocham.86 This would have made the

85

See, “Significant Increase in ASSOCHAM Membership,” The Patriot, 9 July 1990; “Big Rise in
ASSOCHAM Membership,” The Hindustan Times, 9 July 1990; “Sharp Rise in Assocham
Membership,” Business Standard, 9 July 1990. The annual revenue of Assocham increased from
25 lakh to 1 crore as a result of the increase in membership. Also, see “Assocham to Enlarge
Membership,” The Telegraph, 26 November 1990; “Assocham Membership Doubles,” The
Financial Express, 27 November 1990; “Assocham to Have Enlarged Panel,” Business and
Political Observer, 27 November, 1990; “Membership of ASSOCHAM Crosses 50,000,” The
Times of India, 16 May 1991.
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unified body a very powerful organization. Assocham's president at that time
expressed the desire and need to unite business voices in India. This, he felt,
would increase the power of business vis-a-vis the government. He pointed out:
Countries, which have made the most progress in the postwar era like Japan, Germany
and France, have fundamentally one chamber, which is very powerful and is consulted in
policymaking. The Japanese PM sometimes even comes to meet the head of Keidanren,
the apex body of the captains of industry. The German and Paris chambers of commerce
are almost a part of the respective governments and the status of the British
87
Confederation of Industry is well known.

Simultaneously, the competition between the two main national
organizations had heated up. FICCI’s sponsorship of the joint business councils,
involving cooperation and networking with business actors from other countries
as well as the government officials, was a source of envy for members of other
associations. Members of CEI felt that their exclusion from these councils, and
their monopolization by FICCI, was unfair.88 Competition was also evident
through the movement of members from one organization to another. After 1987,
Assocham saw the entry of many new members, other chambers, and big
corporate houses. From 1987 to 1991, the direct membership doubled to 500 and
the indirect membership increase eightfold to 52,000. In 1991, nine more big
companies became the “patron members” of the association.89 These included a
wide array of industrial companies that gave added prestige and reputation to the
organization. After this induction, Assocham enjoyed the patronage of such
companies as Tata Sons, Bajaj Auto, Mahindra and Mahindra, Chowgulke and
Co, Hindustan Lever, ITC, Philips Carbon Black, (RPG), Shaw Wallace and
Company, Premier Automobiles, The Mafatlal Spinning and Company, The
MRF, Modi Xerox, DLF Universal, Indian Aluminum, and the Amalgamation Ltd
(Simpson group). Many of these companies had left the FICCI and joined
90
Assocham, thus putting a competitive pressure on FICCI. It could be argued that
CEI through this transformation wanted to replace FICCI as the single most
powerful industry association in the country.91 Increased competition between
“CEI Changing Name to take on FICCI, Assocham,” Business and Political Observer, 7
November 1991.
87
Subir Roy, “CEI, ASSOCHAM merger move: Industry eager to Speak with One Voice,” The
Times of India, 16 May 1991.
88
Interview with CII official, New Delhi, 23 August 2003.
89
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Patron Members,” The Independent, 18 February 1991; “ASSOCHAM Gains 9 More Members,”
Indian Express, 18 February 1991.
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FICCI and Assocham provided a rare opening for organizations like CEI to think
about entering the competitive fray, and they did.
Competition and Developmental Transformation
The specific business-politics relationship in late 1980s and early 1990s
India shaped the nature of the new organization that took shape. Historical
conjuncture mattered. Up to that point, India’s regulatory system and the
business-politics relationship were analogous to a political exchange: in exchange
for specific favors, business actors supported governments and politicians. The
government’s role was overly regulative and the business associations sought only
particularistic benefits for their firms or sectors abandoning any governance or
developmental activities. Thus, India came to be invoked as a classic “rent92
seeking society” and its business-state pattern characterized by “embedded
93
particuralism.” This larger pattern contributed to the organizational malaise in
which FICCI found itself. By the late 1980s the weakness of existing associations,
specifically their inability to provide any value-added to their members and to
facilitate long-term development of the economy, had become apparent. Most
business associations in India served the interest of few powerful business groups
rather than their larger membership base or needs of a reforming government.
AIEI/CEI, excluded from this system, sought to distinguish themselves by
providing key developmental services to their members and sought international
access. With the opening in the system and Rajiv Gandhi’s ascent to power, CEI
articulated a new ‘business model’ of associations, which would provide services
to the government as well as its members. Given the political factionalism of the
existing associations, CEI organized a strong secretariat-led organization, which
would keep above the fray of infighting among business houses. In doing so, they
offered a distinct organizational and service model to the government and existing
associations (FICCI and Assocham), which were hounded by infighting and
political interference by powerful business houses within their organizations.
Most crucially, this resonated with Rajiv Gandhi’s reformist agenda, but also
filled a major gap in India’s associational marketplace for developmental
associations. Simultaneously, Rajiv Gandhi sought reform-oriented policy and
concept papers from CEI and encouraged them continue with their innovative
services. Subsequently, state officials—both central and provincial—continued to
seek their services and demand more developmental activities. Most importantly,
CEI’s membership base consisted of engineering firms, run mostly on
professional lines that were engaged in extensive joint ventures and foreign
Standard, 12 January 1992; and “Chambers Vie with Each Other for Supremacy,” Indian Express,
28 May 1992.
92
Kruger (1974).
93
Herring (1999).
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collaborations. They demanded quality-oriented services from their secretariat
and access to foreign markets. Once CII began providing such services, and with
liberalization of the Indian economy, such services came to be more in demand.
Thus, business competition in India took a developmental shape because it filled a
crucial weakness in the then existing system, resonated with the reformist agenda
of the then prime minister, and corresponded with the ongoing liberalization of
the economy, where both markets and states needed information, governance
input, and key services for the onerous transition. This historical form of
associational transformation continued to shape subsequent changes initiated by
other associations as greater competition fueled a ‘race to the top’ among business
associations.
Impact of Inter-Business Competition
In response to the business model presented by CII, FICCI sought to
organize itself and deal with the rise of CII, a powerful competitor. In 1994, the
newly appointed Secretary-General of FICCI, Dr. Amit Mitra said: “I am glad that
Tarun Das has worked wonders with the Confederation of Indian industry. It has
94
helped wake FICCI up.” Many of the reforms initiated by FICCI—campaign to
expand membership and subscription, organizational changes, and changing
purposes to deal with international competition—were in direct response to CII’s
perceived strengths.95 FICCI decided to go into the business of trade shows and
exhibitions, a domain in which CII had already carved a name for itself. FICCI
also started publishing a journal called ‘Quality Trends,’ following in the
footsteps of CII's quality movement.96 In 1994 in an effort to strengthen its
secretariat, a five-member core team was set up to oversee radical re-structuring
of the administrative structures and procedures. FICCI decided to appoint an
economic expert as a CEO who would also be the secretary-general. It was at this
time that Dr. Amit Mitra was chosen to be the Secretary-General.97 Clearly, public
relations and handling public events was prioritized given the positive publicity
being received by CII. A new division titled, “Protocol” was set up to handle
visits of foreign delegations besides looking after the other major functions of the
chamber. “We want to give better hospitality and have proper management of
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important events,” said, Mr. A. K. Rungta, a senior Vice President of FICCI.98 In
1998, a corporatist drive was launched to make FICCI a more efficient
organization. The leadership of FICCI also began to track news stories on the two
organizations and do a comparative evaluation of the media coverage of the two
99
associations. Similar to CII, which seeks to make each of its divisions selfearning and profit oriented, it was decided that FICCI would run on a profit
basis.100 In the mid to late 1990s, FICCI launched a new membership initiative
especially with a view to shake off its “old economy image.” In 2000, around 220
members from the so-called TMT (technology, media, and telecom) sectors joined
the association including such companies as Infosys, S. Kumars, Aptec, Sony
Entertainment Hughes Network systems, and Silverline Tech. Faced with
competition FICCI realized that “unless we have a good membership base we will
lose our voice as an apex industry chamber and also lack financial muscle.”101
Reciprocally, a resurgent FICCI has begun to put competitive pressure on CII:
Tarun Das recently said: “Yes we are very different from FICCI but their
presence has kept us on our toes, we have to constantly innovate.”102 Thus,
competition within the business system shaped the transformation of existing
organizations (in this case FICCI and Assocham) into developmental associations.
Yet this competition prevented united collective action on the part of all three
associations or any moves toward merger or unity. India, despite globalization
and the transformation into developmental associations, continues to be a ‘state
dominated pluralist system’ in which numerous groups vie for the state’s attention
and business is fragmented. Despite many attempts to unite business action,
merger moves between CII, FICCI, and Assocham or even joint efforts or
campaigns between the associations, could not succeed.103
The first such merger was mooted in June-July 1990, but came to
naught.104 In July 1992, an apex committee constituted by the presidents of the
three chambers—FICCI, CII, and Assocham—was proposed. It was seen as
necessary to coordinate among the three chambers given economic liberalization,
which had changed the role of the chambers from ‘representation’ to that of
“partners of economic growth.” The main task of the committee was to have joint
98
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meetings with the prime minister, government leaders, and foreign dignitaries.105
This body failed to take shape at that time as leading industrialists in FICCI felt
106
that such a body would affect its functioning. Again in 1995, another joint body
was mooted to coordinate strategy vis-à-vis external actors. The initiative to have
a unified front was first mooted by L.M. Thapar and Mr. S.K. Birla in early 1995
[members of FICCI]. CII president, Mr. Rajive Kaul, also favored the idea of
working together both with FICCI and Assocham on issues relating to external
relations. This effort followed a realization by top industrialists that, “they are
wasting their time, energy and money in separately hosting visiting foreign
businessmen under the aegis of Assocham, CII or FICCI when the issues for
discussion are common. So why not constitute a coordinated body which gives
equal representation to the three apex chambers.”107 Yet again, this body was
never instituted and the three chambers today continue to invite foreign
108
dignitaries separately. In 1993 attempts to form an India International Business
Council (IIBC) by R.P Goenka, with the support from the foreign ministry of the
Government of India, and with inclusion of all the three chambers came to
nothing as it increased infighting rather than any collective or cooperative
109
action. Again in 2000, there was some effort to present a joint set of
recommendations on the annual budget but the three chambers could not agree to
do so. FICCI proposed the joint proposal idea but CII and Assocham preferred to
go it alone and give their separate suggestions to the Finance Minister.110 Thus,
competitive politics between the three chambers has continued to be a pervasive
feature of the interest representation map in India. On one hand, the lack of
business unity affects the nature of business coherence and the strength with
which the business community can negotiate with the government. On the other
hand, this competition stimulates adoption of developmental features by both CII
and FICCI.
Institutional Reasons for the Persistence of Fragmentation among Business
Associations
State leaders also have strong incentives to encourage the ongoing
fragmentation among the main business bodies. In 2001, the BJP’s leadership
105
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sought to “discipline” the CII, which it thought had become too powerful. The
prime minister refused to attend a CII function and began to sponsor and
111
encourage its rival, the FICCI. This divide and rule strategy continued when
FICCI was given the opportunity to sponsor a prestigious Indian Diaspora event
in 2003 and 2004 where the prime minister addressed the delegates. This selective
access to some business associations further enhanced the competitive fervor
among the two business associations and the ability of the state to shape the
political power of business groups. Thus, state actors, at key moments, gave or
denied access to business associations.
India’s fragmented cabinet structure (coalition governments in the 1990s)
and its ongoing regionalization also prevented the consolidation of business
associations; many associations had access to different types and levels of state
institutions. In the mid 1980s and early 1990s, CII was linked to the Ministry of
Finance and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and cultivated its connections
with the civil service. FICCI had strong links with the Congress Party and other
ministries such as the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. As regional forces
became more institutionalized, CII and FICCI accelerated their state-level
112
programs and offices; multiple institutional access in India’s “divided leviathan”
facilitated these business associations but also limited their consolidation and
development into an encompassing nation-wide association. Simultaneously, as
India’s political system became more “decentered,”113 business associations
diversified their strategies to target many different parties (especially regional
parties) and coalition forces. For example, CII began to interact with numerous
opposition parties when a minority government of PV Narasimha Rao needed
support from opposition parties for the survival of its economic reform program
and coalition partners of the BJP government from 1996 onwards.114 The need to
access and build interactions with multiple power centers within the Indian state
prevented the transformation of these business associations into a coherent nationwide association; thus the nature of state power—its divided character—shaped
the continuing fragmentation within the business community.
Conclusion
Conventional scholarship views business associations as functional
responses to crucial market and state failures or as rent-seeking organizations
111
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seeking private benefits. Both these views are non-political; one views business
organizations as adequate functional responses, while the other fails to theorize
the role of the state and political institutions. I propose an alternative framework
that looks at the interaction between powerful business actors, the pre-existing
institutional context, and the nature of state power. In my argument, business
associations are political organizations seeking power and influence. Their
developmental role in a society is a byproduct of their power-seeking activities. In
this respect they are similar to other political organizations in society. In seeking
power, they respond and adapt to the existing distribution of power, the sinews of
state power and potential of threat from other associations. Thus, in dirigiste
contexts, nature and distribution of state power and business competition will
shape the activities, tactics, and strategies adopted by business associations.
If this is true, then, how may we understand the rise and consolidation of
power by new business associations, like CII, and the transformation of existing
business association, like FICCI? Giving analytical importance to the nature of
state power in a system will tell us that new associations will arise only when
openings in the national political opportunity structure allow access and new
opportunities to such emergent organizations. Certain state actors may catalyze
their emergence and development. These insights are derived from Ben Ross
Schneider’s argument about the role of specific actions and incentives of state
actors (rather than macro state or political variables). I combine his stress on the
role on state actors and their incentives with the idea from the social movement
literature that changes in political opportunities and constraints within the state
may provide the openings for business organization or disorganization. When
such openings exist, reformers within the state may be emboldened to encourage
the organization of business. Reformist state allies must facilitate the entry of
outsider organizations and allow them access. Further, and most crucially, the
entry of new associations and organizations is conditioned not only by the
opportunities and openings, but also threats and challenges within the dominant
115
power hierarchy. Thus, the nature and structure of the domestic business
environment may be a crucial element in the domestic opportunity structure. In
established democracies, where interest groups have long-standing activities and
power, openings within the business system—weakness of existing associations,
and competition with other peak associations (a competitive versus a monopolistic
business environment)—will shape the rise of new developmental associations.
Such competition with rival associations may catalyze new and existing
associations to acquire developmental features.
This analysis of India presents a few interesting and puzzling features to
our comparative understanding of business development. The 1990s saw the
transformation of a weak and fragmented business system into a developmental
115
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yet fragmented business system. In contrast to the general presumption that
competition between associations may weaken both, competition, in fact,
116
contributed to the transformation of weaker associations into stronger ones.
Even more interestingly, despite an enhancement of business power (with
globalization), the state continues to shape the nature and extent of business
access to the political system. State actors also facilitate the rise of better
organizations when this suits their public policy purposes (reform program) and
aids in power struggles within a conservative state.
These conclusions emerge from a historically oriented framework that
pays careful attention to both the macro-political environment and the mesoinstitutional business environment faced by capital and collective organizations.
Employing concepts from the social movement literature as well as historical
institutional arguments yields a better understanding of the political
underpinnings of collective action. This framework is more attuned to the political
and power dynamics that give shape to interest representation in globalizing India
than its alternatives. Thus, an analysis of developmental collective action in India
warns us against taking an overly functional account of business associations.
Associations and organizations not only serve functional needs of its members
and the state but also seek political power and influence; they, therefore, must be
understood with the help of political and contextual variables.
This empirical analysis points toward the theoretical importance of key
concepts used in this article: the political opportunity structure, and impact of
historical institutions. Reformist openings within the state represented by Rajiv
Gandhi (India’s prime minister from 1985-1989) and Manmohan Singh (India’s
finance minister in the early 1990s) point toward the need to analyze the role of
specific state actors, and the structure of opportunities and threats presented by
various political institutions in other contexts. Equally important, the historical
matrix of institutions in the form of federal structures and the legacy of informal
and dirigiste state traditions, point to the power of historical institutionlist
arguments. This analysis of continuity and transformation in business politics
shows the path-dependent character of institutions, revealing how apparently non117
functional institutions persist. Yet pre-existing institutional patterns are not
merely sources for inefficiency; they also provide pre-conditions for innovation.
Given the historical pattern of business-state nexus—its rent-seeking and
particularistic character—competition among associations stimulated the adoption
of developmental features by many associations as each sought to distinguish
themselves from the weak organizations of the recent past.

116
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We therefore need an independent theory of historical genesis and
transformation of developmental associations. Such a theory must attend
explicitly to political variables, conceptualized as set of opportunities and threats
and to changing openings within them; the rise of developmentally oriented
associations, a somewhat rare occurrence, must struggle against the alignment of
political forces in the larger system. I identified three important elements of the
larger political system which play a major role in giving birth to developmental
associations: the role of the state leadership; the structure of the state (federalism),
and the competitive configuration of the business system. The isolation of these
variables for India has led me to outline the story of the transformation of
business collective action in India. Threats from competitive organizations and
the extent of organizational weakness in the business system may facilitate the
rise and consolidation of developmental-oriented organizations. A competitive
business system—marked by a large number of associations, movement of
members among the associations, competitive effort to seek the government’s
attention—may facilitate the transformation of existing associations into
developmental ones. Second, the role of the state in facilitating the emergence and
transformation of developmentally oriented associations may prove to be more
crucial than prevailing theories or predictions about receding state power predict.
Despite globalization, states continue to shape the nature and power of business
collective action.
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